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Reflecting on Absolute Infinity
Philip Welch & Leon Horsten
Abstract
This article is concerned with reflection principles in the context of Cantor’s conception
of the set theoretic universe. We argue that within such a conception reflection principles
can be formulated that confer intrinsic plausibility to strong axioms of infinity.1
Introduction
The perspective adopted throughout most of this article may be taken for the purposes of
discussion to be that of set theoretic platonism, which holds that the mathematical uni-
verse consists of collections. Often that universe is conceived as built over a collection of
Urelemente, (as Zermelo did) such as the natural numbers, or the reals, or, . . . that are not
themselves sets. For brevity’s sake however we assume here that there are no Urelemente.
This entails that we take even mathematical objects that are often assumed to be somehow
irreducible, such as real numbers and natural numbers, to be represented by collections
in the universe of sets. This assumption does not affect our arguments, but it does re-
flect the fact that we are not concerned with the problems of indeterminacy of reference
to which Benacerraf has drawn attention.2 Zermelo held that the mathematical universe
forms a potentially infinite sequence of sets of a special kind, which he called ‘normal do-
mains’. Quantification over sets is necessarily restricted: we cannot quantify over all sets.
1The second author would like to thank the audiences at the philosophy of mathematics seminar at Oxford
(March 2011) and at the philosophy of mathematics seminar of the Institut d’Histoire et Philosophie des Sciences
et des Techniques (Paris, October, 2011), where early versions of this article was presented. We are both indebted
to Gabriel Uzquiano, Tony Anderson, Sam Roberts, Øystein Linnebo, Kentaro Fujimoto, Peter Koellner, James
Studd, and Mark van Atten for immensely valuable comments and suggestions.
2Paul Benacerraf, What numbers could not be. Philosophical Review 74(1965), p. 47–73.
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Zermelo’s viewpoint allows the motivation of set theoretical principles that go beyond the
standard axioms of ZFC.
Cantor, by contrast, held that the set theoretic universe exists as a completed absolute in-
finity. The Burali-Forti paradox and Russell’s paradox were initially interpreted as showing
that Cantor’s ‘naive’ set theory, as it is still sometimes called, is inconsistent. It was thought
(erroneously) that Cantor had failed to recognise that the mathematical universe cannot it-
self constitute a set. Cantor himself protested that he never took the set theoretic universe
as a whole to be a set. Nowadays, Cantor is rarely accused of having defended an outright
inconsistent theory of sets. Nevertheless, according to the received view, Cantor’s ideas
about the set theoretic universe as a whole are outdated, and ultimately philosophically
untenable.3
Certainly there are, as we shall see, tensions in Cantor’s view of the nature of the exis-
tence of the set theoretic universe. However we claim that a Cantorian viewpoint, when
appropriately understood, can be nevertheless more powerful and fruitful than Zermelo’s
view of the set theoretic universe. This is manifested in the motivation of reflection princi-
ples in set theory. It is known that on Zermelo’s conception of the set theoretic universe,4
only weak reflection principles can be motivated, which give rise to small large cardinal
principles such as strongly inaccessible cardinals, and perhaps arguably with some more
work, to so-called Mahlo cardinals but to little more. It is also known that a Cantorian con-
ception of the set theoretic universe, as formalised by von Neumann, allows for the further
motivation of somewhat stronger reflection principles.5
I The Zermelean and Cantorian Universes
Zermelo was the first to hold that, Urelemente aside, the mathematical universe consists
3For one expression of this view, cf. Ignacio Jane´,. The role of the Absolutely Infinite in Cantor’s conception of
set. Erkenntnis 42(1995), p. 375–402.
4Ernst Zermelo, On boundary numbers and domains of sets, 1930 Translated by M. Hallett. In: W. Ewald, From
Kant to Hilbert: a source book in mathematics. Volume 2, Oxford University Press, 1996, p. 1208–1233.
5Paul Bernays, Zur Frage der Unendlichkeitsschemata in der axiomatische Mengenlehre. In: Essays on the
Foundations of Mathematics, Magnus Press, 1961, p. 3–49, and William Tait, Constructing cardinals from below. In:
Tait, W. The provenance of pure reason: essays in the philosophy of mathematics and its history. Oxford University Press,
2005, p. 133–154.
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only of sets. Through the work of Zermelo, Skolem, Fraenkel, and von Neumann, it be-
came established in the 1920s that sets are governed by the laws of ZFC. This has become
the most prevalent form of set theoretic platonism: there are only sets, and they obey the
principles of ZFC.
The question is thus raised as to how the sets are related to the mathematical universe.
Zermelo’s viewpoint can be canvassed as follows.6 When we are engaged in set theory,
our quantifiers always range over a domain of discourse D, which Zermelo calls a ‘nor-
mal domain’. The entities over which our set theoretic quantifiers range are sets: they are
governed by the principles of standard set theory (ZFC). Our domain of discourse D itself
is also a collection. Since there are no collections other than sets, our domain of discourse
must also be governed by the principles of ZFC. However, on pain of contradiction, D can
then not be included as an element in our domain of discourse. Nonetheless, we can ex-
pand our domain of discourse so that it includes D as an element. The expanded domain of
discourse D′ can even be taken to be such that it also satisfies the principles of ZFC. How-
ever the expanded domain D′ will again be a set. So the previous considerations apply to
D′ also. In sum, even though the domain of discourse can always be expanded, it never
comprises all sets. The outcome of this viewpoint for Zermelo, is that the mathematical uni-
verse is a potential infinite sequence of (actually infinite) domains of discourse that satisfy
the principles of ZFC.7 There thus was for Zermelo a hierarchy of normal domains (that
we should now call ‘models of set theory’) indexed by Cantor’s ordinal numbers. He wrote
of ‘The two opposite tendencies of the thinking spirit, the idea of creative advancement and
that of collective completion [Abschluss] [. . . ] are symbolically represented and reconciled
[here]’:8 as we advance through the Cantorian ordinals we see more sets are created which
6p. 1231–1233 in Ernst Zermelo, op.cit. For a detailed description of Zermelo’s technical results and philosophi-
cal view as articulated here, see Section 6 of Akihiro Kanamori, Zermelo and set theory, Bulletin of Symbolic Logic
10(2004), p. 487–553. For an account of the role of Fraenkel and von Neumann in this development, in particular
with respect to the axiom of Replacement, see Section 5 of Akihiro Kanamori, The higher infinite. Large cardinals in
set theory from their beginnings. Springer, 1994.
7A similar view is expressed at p. 219 of Parsons, Sets and Classes. Nouˆs 8(1974). Reprinted in Parsons, C.
Mathematics in Philosophy. Selected Essays. Cornell University Press, 1983, p. 209–220.
8Op.cit., p. 1233.
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are collected into this unending tower of completed domains.
There are basic structural insights about the set theoretic universe that escaped Cantor.
For instance, Zermelo in his later years after adopting the Axiom of Foundation viewed the
set theoretic universe as structured into a layered hierarchy of initial segments Vα (with α
ranging over the ordinals) that are sets.9 Zermelo also saw that the above picture yields
initial segments of the universe of the form Vα in which all the axioms of ZFC are true.
Cantor, perforce in this informal, pre-axiomatic phase of the subject’s development did
not see that far. Nonetheless, we shall argue that Cantor’s conception of the set theoretic
universe as a completed infinity is more powerful and more plausible than that of Zermelo.
In discussing Cantor’s ideas one has to be careful, as Tait warns us, of not falling into a
trap of anachronistic thinking: Cantor did not have the concept of von Neumann ordinal,
nor of a Vα, before him. The ‘transfinite numbers’ constituting Ω were of an independent
nature as order types. Tait gives a careful analysis in what way Cantor would have inter-
preted a Burali-Forti-like paradox in his (Cantor’s) own terms, given that he did not have
the ordinals.10 Nevertheless Tait concludes Cantor would doubtless have seen the contra-
dictoriness of claiming Ω as a set.
Zermelo’s picture does raise some difficult questions. For one thing, it is not clear in
which dimension the mathematical universe is supposed to vary. His notion of creative
advancement suggests some form of progression or growth but this is not a metaphor that
can be stretched too far. It seems that Zermelo was thinking of iterating the power set in
some autonomous fashion along the ordinals of each normal domain internally, rather than
along some external class of ordinals. For another, there is the question how Zermelo can
get his view across to us. Zermelo calls his theory about normal domains ‘meta-set the-
ory’.11 However he does not elaborate on the question what the domain of discourse of
meta-set theory is. (What is it that we cannot quantify over?) This does not imply that Zer-
9Mirimanoff anticipated this hierarchy in Dmitry Mirimanov Les antinomies de Russell et Burali-Forti et le
proble`me fondamental de la the´orie des ensembles, L’Enseignement Mathematique, 1917, p. 37–52; the work of
Von Neumann was also crucial: see again p. 518 of Kanamori op.cit..
10William Tait, Cantor’s Grundlagen and the Paradoxes of Set Theory In: Tait, W. Ibid., p. 265.
11Op. cit., p. 1233.
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melo’s thesis about the essential restrictedness of quantification is false; however, it does
seem difficult to see how this thesis can be communicated. He nevertheless hypothesised,
as he says, in his ‘meta-set theory’, that there is a one-to-one correspondence between Can-
tor’s ordinals and his normal domains.12 Indeed, for both these reasons it seems somewhat
hard to motivate second order or higher order principles on Zermelo’s ‘potentialist’ view-
point.13 Such principles involve quantification over a completed collection of all classes
over V - which is just what Zermelo does not have. One may perhaps formulate princi-
ples based on a universal class quantification only, but principles involving further use of
such quantifiers beg a domain of quantification. We note that this can be taken as a reason
for preferring Cantor’s view over Zermelo’s. Tait suggests the alternative that we have to
consider the second order quantifiers as applying over each normal domain in turn: thus
ranging over over Vκ+1 for each ‘normal domain’ Vκ .14. We shall return to his point when
we discuss reflection below.
Cantor’s theory of the nature of the set theoretic universe as a whole is not easy to
summarise. His views seem to have undergone a transformation around 1895. We first
discuss his earlier views, and then turn to his later views.
Cantor’s basic convictions preclude Zermelo’s potential infinity of (completed) normal
domains ever to be the final word about the nature of the set theoretic universe. The set
theoretic universe could not, in Cantor’s view, form a potential infinity of actual infinities
because of what Hallett calls Cantor’s domain principle:
There is no doubt that we cannot do without variable quantities in the sense
of the potential infinite; and from this the necessity of the actual infinite can
also be proven, as follows: In order for there to be a variable quantity in some
mathematical inquiry, the ‘domain’ of its variability must strictly speaking be
known beforehand through a definition. However, this domain cannot itself be
12Op. cit. Last paragraph p.1233 “To the unbounded series of Cantor ordinals there corresponds a similarly unbounded
[double-]series of essentially different set-theoretic models . . .
13For a discussion of various aspects of this problem, see also the essays in Agustı´n Rayo and Gabriel Uzquiano
(eds) Absolute Generality. Oxford University Press, 2006.
14William Tait, op.cit. p. 142.
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something variable, since otherwise each fixed support for the inquiry would
collapse. Thus, this ‘domain’ is a definite, actually infinite set of values. Thus,
each potential infinite, if it is rigorously applicable mathematically, presupposes
an actual infinite. 15
In this quotation, Cantor speaks of the necessity of ‘knowing’ the domain of variation
through a ‘definition’. Surely Cantor is merely sloppy here, and we are should discount
the epistemological overtones. Another slip can be detected in Cantor’s use of the word
‘set’ in this quotation. Cantor means the argument to be applicable not just to sets but also
to absolute infinities. In particular, this means that the infinity of transfinite sets that poten-
tially exists (as for Zermelo) presupposes an actual, completed absolutely infinite domain
as its range of variation.
Admittedly Cantor was in his writings not very explicit about what he did take the
set theoretic universe as a whole to be. One problem is that it is not in every instance
clear whether he has a theological or a mathematical conception of absolute infinity in
mind. Indeed, he argues that it is the task not of mathematics but of ‘speculative theology’
to investigate what can be humanly known about the absolutely infinite.16 Nonetheless,
in many instances it is clear that Cantor has a mathematical conception of the absolutely
infinite:
The transfinite, with its wealth of arrangements and forms, points with neces-
sity to an absolute, to the ‘true infinite’, whose magnitude is not subject to any
increase or reduction, and for this reason it must be quantitatively conceived as
an absolute maximum.17
We shall concentrate on Cantor’s conception of the ‘quantitatively absolute maximum’,
which is the set theoretic universe as a whole. From the passages discussed above, we
15Mitteilungen zur Lehre vom Transfiniten VII (1887): p. 410–411, in Georg Cantor Abhandlungen mathematischen
und philosophischen Inhalts. Herausgegeben von Ernst Zermelo, Verlag Julius Springer, 1932 (our translation). For an
extended discussion of the domain principle, see p. 7–8 and Ch. 1 of Michael Hallett, Cantorian set theory and
limitation of size. Clarendon Press, Oxford,1984.
16p. 378 in Georg Cantor, ibid.
17Mitteilungen zur Lehre vom Transfiniten V (1887), in Georg Cantor, ibid, p. 405, (our translation).
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conclude that he attributes to it the following properties. It is a fully determinate, fully
actual (‘completed’), inaugmentable totality. It is composed of objects (sets) that are of a
mental nature (‘ideas’). Moreover unlike the sets in the mathematical universe, the universe
as a whole cannot be uniquely characterised.
Burali-Forti’s ‘paradox’ was published in 1897, and from this time one finds a subtle
change of terminology in Cantor’s writings. Whereas before, Cantor used the expression
‘the Absolutely Infinite’ for characterising the set theoretic universe, he now categorises the
set theoretic universe and other proper classes (such as the class of all ordinals) as incon-
sistent multiplicities. In a letter to Dedekind18 he wrote that it had proven to be necessary
to distinguish two kinds of multiplicity. A multiplicity can be of such a nature, that the
assumption of the ‘togetherness’ (‘Zusammenseins’) of a multiplicity’s elements leads to
a contradiction, so that it is impossible to conceive the multiplicity as a unity, as a ‘fin-
ished thing’. He called such multiplicities absolutely infinite or inconsistent multiplicities.
In latter day jargon we should call such ‘proper classes’.19 However the passages do not
show that Cantor no longer believed that the set theoretic universe did not form an inaug-
mentable totality that forms the domain of our mathematical discourse past, present, and
future. Hauser20 has argued that by ‘existing together’ or Zusammensein, Cantor means
‘existing together as elements of a “finished” set’. Thus, what he is saying is merely that
the totality of all transfinite numbers (or all alephs) does not constitute a set and therefore
cannot be an element of some other set. However, Hauser continues, Cantor is not denying
that the transfinite numbers coexist in some other form, namely as apeiron, which is math-
18Letter to Dedekind (1899), p. 443 of Cantor ibid.
19Jane´ has argued that passages such as this letter (and another in 1899 to Hilbert) indicate that Cantor no longer
believed that the set theoretic universe formed a completed infinity (sections 6 and 7 of Ignacio Jane´, The role of
the Absolutely Infinite in Cantor’s conception of set. Erkenntnis 42(1995), p. 375–402) and speculates that Cantor
tacitly moved to a conception of the set theoretic universe as an irreducibly potential entity, whereby he arrived
at a pre-figuration of Zermelo’s conception of the mathematical universe. In his more recent work, (Idealist and
realist elements in Cantor’s approach to set theory. Philosophia Mathematica 18(2010), p. 193–226), he no longer
claims that Cantor actually gave up the thesis of the existence of the mathematical universe as a completed infinity.
However Jane´ rightly stresses that there remains a tension between Cantor’s earlier commitments and Cantor’s
later terminology of inconsistent multiplicities.
20Section 3 of Kai Hauser, Cantor’s Absolute in metaphysics and mathematics, International Philosophical
Quarterly 53(2013), p. 161–188.
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ematically indeterminate, meaning that one cannot assign a cardinal or ordinal number to
the totality of all numbers.
The content of the notion ‘apeiron’ that one finds in Plato is notoriously unclear. So this
does not really help much in the clarification of the nature of the set theoretic universe. In
other words, there is an unresolved interpretative debt at this point on the side of the de-
fender of the Cantorian viewpoint. Such a defender is facing the choice of either upholding
Cantor’s earlier view of the set theoretical universe and trying to make good philosophical
sense of it, or else taking Cantor’s characterisation of the mathematical universe as an in-
consistent multiplicity as the final word, and trying to make sense of that. However both
cannot be done at the same time.
What we propose to do is, in the first instance, to ignore Cantor’s description of the set
theoretic universe as an inconsistent multiplicity. In the following sections, we shall adopt
Cantor’s characterisation of the set theoretic universe as a completed whole, and discuss
how it can be used to motivate ‘top down’ reflection principles. Then we shall formulate
a stronger reflection principle. We shall see that to make sense of this stronger reflection
principle, elements both of Cantor’s earlier views and elements of Cantor’s later views on
the nature of the set theoretic universe can be used.
II Reflection
Cantor came to speak about mathematical absolute infinities in terms redolent of ineffabil-
ity. More modern interpretations of this quality of unknowability are known as reflection
principles. The starting point of set theoretic reflection is the early Cantorian view that the
mathematical Absolutely Infinite is unknowable.21
As it stands, this ‘unknowability’ is indeed a negative statement. However it can be
given a positive interpretation as follows. Let us provisionally identify the mathemati-
cal Absolutely Infinite with the set theoretic universe V. The set theoretic universe is un-
knowable in the sense that we cannot single it out or pin it down by means of any of our
21’The Absolute can only be acknowledged, but never known, not even approximately known’ (Endnote to
section 4: p. 205 in Georg Cantor, op.cit., our translation).
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assertions: no true assertion about V can be made that excludes other unintended interpre-
tations that make the assertion true. In particular—and this is stronger than the previous
sentence—no assertion that we make about V can ensure that we are talking about the
mathematical universe rather than an object in this universe. So if we do make a true as-
sertion φ about V, then there exist sets s such that φ is also true when it is interpreted over
s.
In the late 1890s the Burali-Forti theorem made it abundantly clear that V is not the
only actual whole that is absolutely infinite. So in light of this we must say that the mathe-
matical absolutely infinite comprises, in addition to the mathematical universe as a whole,
all other proper classes.22 However in fact, the above argument should hold true for any
proper class. They can then be said to be unknowable in the sense that no assertion in the
language of sets can be true of only some proper classes. So if we do make a true assertion
concerning a proper class, then there exists sets about which this assertion is already true.
If we truly describe mathematical absolute infinities, then there are set proxies for the ab-
solute infinities such that our description can also truly be taken to range over the proxies.
Cantor did not explicitly articulate this line of argument (although we shall).23
On the face of it, Zermelo’s viewpoint uses a form of set theoretic reflection: every ad-
missible domain of discourse in set theory is a ‘normal domain’, and this can by a reflective
movement be seen to be a set. We cannot quantify over, or in any way make use of, proper
classes, for, in his view, no such things exist, we only have normal domains of the form Vκ
that are models of second order ZFC. The set theoretic universe as a whole is not some-
thing we can talk about, according to Zermelo, for it never exists as a completed realm.
So, literally speaking, Zermelo cannot, according to his own view, truly say that “the set
theoretic universe is so rich that it contains many normal domains”.
The best Zermelo can do, as mentioned above, is simply to postulate that above ev-
22Cantor’s 1899 argument that the ordinals form an inconsistent totality is critically discussed in Jane´ ibid.
p. 395–396.
23There is a view that Cantor used an application of a proto-reflection argument to deduce the existence of the
natural numbers a set. See p. 117–118 of Hallett op.cit.
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ery ordinal, there is an ordinal which is the ‘boundary number’ of a normal domain. In
modern terms, this is expressed as an axiom that postulates unboundedly many strongly
inaccessible cardinals:
Axiom 1 ∀α∃β : β > α ∧ “ β is a strongly inaccessible cardinal ′′.
This seems to say exactly what is required. It says that a fundamental property of the set
theoretic universe, namely making second-order Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory (ZFC2) true,
is reflected in arbitrarily large set-sized domains. However closer inspection reveals that
this cannot exactly be the case: there must be ordinal numbers that fall outside the quan-
tifiers in this axiom. By Zermelo’s own lights, the quantifiers in Axiom 1 must range over
a domain of discourse that forms a set in a wider domain of discourse. There will be or-
dinals in this wider domain of discourse that do not belong to the ‘earlier’ domain of dis-
course. Hence Axiom 1 can only be regarded as our slightly anachronistic formalization
of Zermelo’s ‘meta-set theoretic’ postulate, that the boundary numbers are in one-to-one
correspondence with the Cantorian ordinals. It is only a reflection principle if we allow
ourselves the absolute infinity of the whole of V as a ZFC2 model, (which Zermelo did not)
and then posit reflection on that.
Stronger reflection principles can be formulated if we take Cantor’s view of the set
theoretic universe as a completed infinity seriously. However, to study these reflection
principles in a precise setting, logical laws governing them have to be formulated. The
language that is assumed is the language of second-order (or two-sorted, if you will) set
theory, where the membership symbol is expressing the only fundamental non-logical re-
lation, and where we have two types of variables: the first-order variables range over
sets (x, y, . . .) and the second-order variables range over (proper and improper) classes
(X, Y, . . .). We shall from now on take the sets and classes to be governed by the principles
of Von Neumann-Bernays-Go¨del (NBG) class theory (and worry about the justification for
this later). Indeed, von Neumann’s class theory, the pre-cursor to Bernays’ formulation of
NBG, can be seen as a formalisation of Cantor’s viewpoint (but not as a conceptual clarifi-
10
cation).24
If we take the point of view of Cantor’s early theory of the mathematical universe, and
that there are more absolutely infinite collections than V alone, then we can express the
reflection idea as follows:
Axiom 2 ∀X : Φ(X)→ ∃α : ΦVα(X ∩Vα),
where ΦVα is obtained by relativising all first- and second-order quantifiers to Vα and its
power set, respectively, and where α does not occur free in Φ.
The Zermelian reflection principle (Axiom 1), if it can be so regarded, only expresses
that certain true class theoretical statements are reflected downwards (e.g. the axioms of
ZFC2). Axiom 2 states that every true (second order parametrised) class theoretic statement
is reflected down to some set sized domain. Axiom 2 is stronger than Axiom 1: it implies
large cardinal principles that postulate indescribable cardinals.25
Of course it is then natural to formulate reflection principles of orders higher than two
in an analogous manner. However already the full third-order class reflection principle
is inconsistent, at least for formulae that involve general parameters.26 Tait (op.cit. 2005)
returns to a “bottom up” style of Cantorian reflection. He points out that Cantor’s Principle
with which he introduced the class of transfinite numbers Ω:
If the initial segment Σ of Ω is a set, then it has least strict upper bound S(Σ) ∈
Ω.
has a clearly imprecise, or impredicative, content: for we have to know what a set is before-
hand. Tait suggests therefore a Relativized Cantorian Principle: one formulates an existence
condition C, and the principle asserts that if an initial segment of the ordinals satisfies C
24See von Neumann, An axiomatization of set theory, 1925, In: J. Van Heijenoort (ed) From Frege to Go¨del. A
source book in mathematical logic (1879–1931), Harvard University Press, 1967.
25This axiom and its relatives were discussed in Paul Bernays, op.cit.
26See William Reinhardt, Remarks on reflection principles, large cardinals, and elementary embeddings. in
Proceedings of Symposia in Pure Mathematics. Vol. 10 American Mathematical Society, p. 189–205,1974. But param-
eter free sentences of higher orders are unproblematic. See Victoria Marshall, Higher order reflection principles,
Journal of Symbolic Logic 54(1969), p. 474–489 for an account of higher order reflection with restricted kinds of
parameters.
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then it has its supremum in Ω. Existence principles are then provided which yield third-
order reflection restricted to a certain class of “positive” formulae, on models of the form Vκ ,
which are consistent and stronger than second-order class reflection. Tait thereby demon-
strates that Zermelo’s ‘potentialism’ does not require Zermelo to restrict himself to only
second order language: potentialism can be detached from a purely second order view-
point. Such principles then entail the existence of (strengthenings of) ineffable cardinals, for
example, but do not prove the existence of the least ω-Erdo˝s cardinal: κ(ω).27 Fourth-order
reflection is inconsistent even when restricted to “positive” formulae.28 Indeed, Koellner
gives an argument to the effect that no “internal reflection principle” can ever entail large
cardinal principle axioms that are as strong as the principle that postulates the existence
of κ(ω); the import here is that the latter is consistent with V being Go¨del’s constructible
universe L.
In sum, the situation is this. From Zermelo’s conception of the set theoretic universe
as a potential infinity of sets, the region of small large cardinals in the neighbourhood of
inaccessible cardinals can be motivated. Due to its recognition of proper classes alongside
of sets, the Cantorian point of view can be said to have lead via the work of Bernays et
al., to the above stronger reflection principles of class reflection, strengthened yet further
by the work of Tait, using “bottom up”’ reflection and the relativized Cantorian princi-
ples sketched above. However none of those principles get us near our desideratum, as
these do not take us beyond the small large cardinal principles consistent with V = L.
In particular, the class reflection principles fall below the strength of postulating so-called
measurable cardinals. Indeed, Koellner’s (tentative) conclusion is that intrinsically moti-
vated set or class theoretic reflection principles arising from the iterative concept of set are
either relatively weak or inconsistent.
Go¨del thought that all sound large cardinal principles should be reducible to reflection
27See section 4 of Peter Koellner, On reflection principles. Annals of Pure and Applied Logic, 157(2009), p. 206–
219.
28Section 5, Koellner op.cit.
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principles.29 This sentiment goes against the conclusions that Koellner reached, and is of-
ten regarded as implausible, due to the weakness of all the familiar reflection principles.
Nonetheless, we shall now argue that from a Cantorian point of view Go¨del’s thought can
be given a freer rein. Go¨del himself was an adherent of Cantor’s actualist viewpoint re-
garding the set theoretic universe in contrast to Zermelo’s potentialist viewpoint.30 We
have seen that the set theoretic universe as a whole and all proper classes of sets are recog-
nised by Cantor to (actually) exist: let us call this informal structure (V,∈, C), where C
denotes the collection of all classes. Then the reflection idea tells us that we cannot sin-
gle this structure out by means of any of our assertions. Positively put, any (with some
qualification) assertions that hold in (V,∈, C) must also hold in some set-size structure.
There are various possible ways of trying to making this more precise. We shall not try
to give a catalogue of the pro’s and contra’s of various options. Rather, we shall concen-
trate on one way that seems to us especially powerful, natural, and fruitful. Consider the
following principle:
Axiom 3 There is an initial segment of the universe Vκ , together with D, some classes over Vκ , and
a nontrivial elementary embedding
j : (Vκ ,∈, D) −→ (V,∈, C)
with critical point κ.31
It turns out that the strength of such an assumption turns on the relationship between
D and the set of all classes over Vκ , which of course is Vκ+1. What the embedding function
does is to send the elements of D, thus regarded as a sub-collection of the proper classes
of Vκ , to elements of C: j(κ) = On, j(Vκ) = V, j(Card ∩ κ) = Card, . . . etc. whilst not
moving any sets of Vκ . Such principles consistently follow from, and indeed, by varying D,
29Section 8.7.9 of Hao Wang, A Logical Journey. From Go¨del to philosophy, MIT Press, 1996.
30Cfr. section 8.3.4 of Wang, op.cit.
31I.e., j(κ) > κ whereas for z ∈ Vκ , j is the identity transformation: j(z) = z.
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imply, reflection principles involving higher order language indescribability as discussed
by Bernays; in such cases D ⊂ P(Vκ)L ⊆ Vκ+1, where L denotes Go¨del’s universe of
constructible sets (N.B. the proper inclusion).
Moreover new increased strength arises when we demand greater identity between
(Vκ ,∈, D) and (V,∈, C): if D ⊇ P(κ)L then we obtain what set theorists often dub the
“smallest large cardinal” (the indescribables etc. notwithstanding) but let us call it here the
least extra-constructible large cardinal: it is that first principle that generates a fully truth
preserving non-trivial map from L to L, and thus a large cardinal inconsistent with V =
L. By making further demands on the closure of D within Vκ+1 and its corresponding j
yet further principles of this nature can be derived and which encompass a spectrum of
strong axioms of infinity connected with L-like inner models. For example, if K is some
larger definable inner model, then requiring that D ⊇ P(κ)K will ensure this model K also
will embed to itself, and by known methods will engender a yet stronger large cardinal
property. The formalism of the Axiom 3 is thus extremely flexible. However of particular
interest for this paper is the natural completion of this line of thought where D is taken to
be maximal:32
Axiom 4 There is an initial segment of the universe Vκ and a nontrivial elementary embedding
j : (Vκ ,∈, Vκ+1) −→Σ0∞ (V,∈, C)
with critical point κ, where the subscript Σ0∞ indicates elementarity for first-order formulas (with
class parameters).
As was mentioned earlier, it may be assumed that (V,∈, C) makes at least the principles of
NBG true. Let us call this principle the Global Reflection Principle (GRP).33 So Axiom 3 says
32Philip Welch, Global reflection principles. Paper prepared for Exploring the Frontiers of Incompleteness. in Isaac
Newton Institute Pre-print Series, No. INI12051-SAS, June 2012; see also Philip Welch, On Obtaining Woodin’s
Cardinals to appear in Woodin’s 60th Birthday Celebratory volume, American Mathematical Society Memoirs.
33A slightly stronger version of any GRP requires in Axiom 3 that for every ordinal α, there is a reflection
(Vκ ,∈, Vκ+1) that includes this ordinal α. Everything we say generalises straightforwardly to the stronger axiom.
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that the set theoretic universe (with all its proper classes) is reflected in a particular way to
a set-size initial segment of the universe.
The level of elementarity that is insisted upon can be varied. Mostly we shall only dis-
cuss the precise form of GRP as given above. If we need to distinguish the elementarity
for formulae in some class Γ other than Σ0∞ posited in such principles, we may denote
the resulting global reflection principle as GRPΓ. We thus could also impose the stronger
requirement of second order Σ1∞-elementarity. Alternatively, we could impose the appar-
ently weaker requirement of Σ01-elementarity. (However it can be shown that GRP with
Σ01-elementarity is equivalent to GRP with Σ
0
∞-elementarity.)
The principle GRP says that the universe with its parts is, to a certain degree, indistin-
guishable from at least one of its initial segments Vκ and its parts. It says that the whole
set theoretic universe with all its proper classes is mirrored in a set-sized initial segment
(Vκ ,∈, Vκ+1), where the first-order quantifiers range over Vκ , and where the reflection of a
proper class X is obtained by ‘cutting it off’ at level Vκ .
GRP expresses the idea of reflection in a substantially more powerful way than Ax-
iom 2. Axiom 2 just says that each (second-order) statement is reflected from the set the-
oretic universe to some Vκ (where possibly different second-order statements are reflected
in different Vκ’s): therefore it does not entail that the universe as a totality particularly re-
sembles any one single set-like initial segment. However GRP postulates that the whole
universe (V,∈, C) is indistinguishable from an initial ‘cut’ (Vκ ,∈, Vκ+1) in a very specific
way, namely in a way such that no proper class can be distinguished from a proper subset
of itself (its intersection with Vκ+1). Thereby GRP is a more robustly ontological form of
reflection than Axiom 2. In the class theoretic context there is a collection of sets which,
together with its classes, forms a simulacrum of the universe with its classes.
However is GRP a reflection principle? In contrast with traditional reflection principles
such as Axiom 2, the reflection effected by GRP is mediated by the posited embedding
function j acting on classes. For this reason, Koellner suggests that therefore GRP is more
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aptly called a resemblance principle (or perhaps a projection principle) than a reflection princi-
ple. However whichever choice of words one settles on, in our view, GRP captures the idea
that our whole picture of the universe with its classes is nevertheless strongly reflected in
an initial segment of that universe. We are not arguing that it is motivated by the iterative
concept of set in isolation, but only with additional class-theoretic considerations.
Note that the relationship of ‘similarity’ between an initial segment of V, Vκ say, is not
purely a first order elementary one about sets: that Vκ is first order indistinguishable from
V, more usually put as being elementarily equivalent to V. This usual sense is relatively
weak: it is not an extra-constructible principle (and indeed in one formulation is merely
equiconsistent with ZFC). Nor is the ‘similarity’ that of the usual second order reflection,
where some second order formulaΦ(~x, ~X) about some sets~x and classes ~X, true in (V,∈, ~X)
reflects to some κ and is thus true in (Vκ ,∈, ~X ∩ Vκ), with ~x ∈ Vκ . Nor would it be if
we insisted this reflection was always to the same Vκ irrespective of choice of ~X or Φ (as
long as ~x ∈ Vκ), as is the case with GRP — such would still be consistent with V = L.
We must have indistinguishability between (V,∈, C) and (Vκ ,∈, Vκ+1), that is with all the
classes of Vκ included. GRP is thus stronger than all these, and expresses a first order
indistinguishability between one single level of the ramified hierarchy and V for formulae
containing named classes. The relationship between those classes X ∈ C needed, and the
corresponding class X′ in Vκ+1 is the simplest possible: X ∩ Vκ+1 = X′. But, and this
is the point, any such X′ ∈ Vκ+1 must arise in this way: it is a relationship between all
of (Vκ ,∈, Vκ+1) and (V,∈, C).34 That GRP is then extra-constructible is easily indicated.
Define U by:
Y ∈ U ⇔ Y ⊆ κ ∧ κ ∈ j(Y).
Then well known methods show that U is a normal measure, i.e. κ is, in V, a measurable
cardinal.35
34One perspective is to say that there is a collection D (of size |Vκ+1|) of classes in C, so that (Vκ ,∈, 〈c˙〉c∈Vκ+1 )
is elementarily equivalent to (V,∈, 〈X˙〉X∈D). Of course all we are doing here is taking D = ran(j). Moreover
c = X ∩Vκ for the relevant c, X.
35For further details on the strength of GRP we refer the reader to Philip Welch, op. citatis.
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Perhaps it is possible to ‘split’ the content of GRP into an embeddingless reflection
principle on the one hand, and a strong class choice principle on the other hand (which
yields the embedding function). We will not pursue this possibility in this paper, but merely
note that Zermelo viewed choice axioms as logical principles.36
III Sets, parts, and pluralities
Now that the philosophical motivation behind, and the content of, GRP has been ex-
plained, we turn to the ontological assumptions of the framework in which it is formulated.
If we want to formally express GRP, then at first blush it seems that we need a language
of third order: the function j that is postulated to exist pairs sets of Vκ with themselves and
sets of Vκ+1 with proper classes (elements of C). However the mapping j that is postulated
by GRP can be regarded as a second-order object: as a proper class K consisting of ordered
pairs such that its first element a is in the domain of j (namely: Vκ+1) and the second
element j(a) is an element of Vκ
⋃ C.
We also need a satisfaction predicate to express the elementarity of the embedding.
GRP deploys two notions of truth: truth in the structure (Vκ , Vκ+1,∈), and truth in (V, C,∈
). Truth in (Vκ , Vκ+1,∈) can of course be defined in a two sorted language L2∈, whereas
truth in (V, C,∈) cannot. However for our proof-theoretic purposes, adding a Tarskian
compositional satisfaction predicate T to L2∈ and postulating that the compositional truth
axioms hold for L2∈ suffices to express what it means for a statement of L2∈ to be true and
to prove basic properties of truth. In sum, the fact that GRP postulates the elementarity of
the embedding j does not necessitate us to go up to third order (and this remains so even if
we were to take a strong version of GRP that is Σ1∞ preserving).
As mentioned earlier, Cantor’s distinction between sets and Absolute Infinities is a pre-
figuration of the distinction between sets and proper classes, which was articulated explic-
itly by von Neumann. The difference with Cantor’s theory is that von Neumann did take
classes as well as sets to be governed by mathematical laws. It is just that classes are objects
36Ernst Zermelo, Proof that every set can be well-ordered, 1904, translated in J. van Heijenoort (ed) From Frege
to Go¨del. A source book in mathematical logic 1879–1931. Harvard University Press, 1967, p. 139–141, p. 141.
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sui generis: they obey different laws. Proper classes are objects that have elements, but they
are not themselves elements. So, in particular, there is no analogue of the power set axiom
for proper classes. However it remained an open question how talk of proper classes ought
to be interpreted.
To this question we now turn. What we require is an interpretation of class talk that
supports the global reflection idea and that is philosophically attractive. We will start by
discussing views of the nature of classes that do not meet this requirement. Then we will
articulate our preferred view, and explain why it should be preferred over its rivals.
If proper classes are taken to be collections of some sort (‘super-sets’, or ‘collections that
are too large to be sets’), then it is somewhat mysterious why they can have elements but
not be elements. In Maddy’s words:37
The problem is that when proper classes are combinatorially determined just
as sets are, it becomes very difficult to say why this layer of proper classes on
top of V is not just another stage of sets we forgot to include. It looks like just
another rank; saying it is not seems arbitrary. The only difference we can point
to is that the proper classes are banned from set membership, but so is the κth
rank banned from membership in sets of rank less than κ.
And then why is there no singleton, for instance, that contains the class of the ordinals as its
sole element? An alternative would be to say that proper classes can be collected into new
wholes, but that these could (for obvious reasons) not themselves be proper classes. They
would be again a sui generis kind of objects: super-classes. However in this way we embark
on a hierarchical road that few find worth traveling. On this picture, classes, super-classes,
et cetera, look too much like sets. We seem to be replicating the cumulative hierarchy of
sets whilst incurring the cost of introducing a host of different kinds of set-like objects. In
sum, we reject views of classes as collections on philosophical grounds.
Parsons has defended a view according to which class talk can be interpreted as short-
37Penelope Maddy Proper classes. The Journal of Symbolic Logic 48(1983), p. 122.
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hand for talk about set theoretic predicates (and a truth predicate for mathematical formu-
lae).38 The attractiveness of this view is that, in sharp contrast with the view that we have
just discussed, this interpretation of class theory does not carry ontological baggage at all.
Unfortunately, this nominalist interpretation of classes is not open to us. On Parsons’
interpretation of class theory, impredicative definitions of classes are inadmissible (for cir-
cular). In other words, it is crucial to his view that the class comprehension scheme is
restricted to predicates that contain no bound class quantifiers, as is the case in NBG.39
Now we have argued earlier that GRP does commit us to accepting all instances of the
class comprehension scheme of NBG. But it is not hard to see that GRP commits us to at
least some undefinable classes. In particular, the class embedding j that is posited by GRP
can readily be shown not to be definable in NBG.40
Boolos and Uzquiano have argued that second-order quantification can be interpreted
in such a way that it does not commit one to classes of elements as objects in their own right
belonging to an overall underlying domain of discourse. This is done by reading a formula
of the form ∃X : φ(X) as: “there are some entities such that φ holds of them”. Such a plural
interpretation can be applied to second-order ZFC, yielding a plural interpretation of class
theory.41 In other words, we can recognise the truth of systems of class theory without
recognising anything beyond sets in our ontology: class theory without proper classes.42
The consensus in the literature seems to be that the plural interpretation of classes is
38See Charles Parsons, Sets and Classes. Nouˆs 8(1974). Reprinted in Parsons, C. Mathematics in Philosophy.
Selected Essays. Cornell University Press, 1983, p. 209–220.
39See Charles Parsons also points out that with an interpretation of classes as first-order definable over sets it
is possible to have theories slightly stronger than NBG, see his Informal Axiomatization, Formalization, and the
concept of Truth also reprinted in Mathematics in Philosophy, p.88.
40Otherwise there will be an infinite descending sequence of critical points κ that meet the conditions of GRP,
contradicting the Axiom of Foundation.
41Boolos viewed this in the context of interpreting set theory in a second-order logical setting: see George Boolos,
To be is to be a value of a variable (or some values of some variables). Journal of Philosophy 81(1984), p. 430–
449, and Nominalist platonism, Philosophical Review 94(1985), p. 327–344. Uzquiano does not tie this view to
a particular view on logic: see Gabriel Uzquiano, Plural quantification and classes. Philosophia Mathematica
11(2003), p. 67–81.
42Or so the argument goes. For arguments to the effect that appeal to plural reference to avoid commitment
to proper classes ultimately is a cheat: see Michael Resnik, Second-order logic still wild. Journal of Philosophy
85(1988), p. 75–87, Alan Hazen, Against pluralism, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 71(1993), p. 132–144, Øys-
tein Linnebo, Plural Quantification Exposed. Nouˆs 37(2003), p. 71–92.
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compatible with the existence of impredicative classes. Indeed, the plural interpretation is
usually taken to support full Kelly-Morse class theory.43 After all, there is no reason to think
that any bunch of sets is predicatively definable. Thus the plural interpretation cannot be
ruled out of being incompatible with GRP. The problem with the interpretation of classes
as pluralities is that it is difficult to see how the intrinsic philosophical motivation of GRP
in terms of the notion of resemblance between entities can be upheld if the class quantifiers
are interpreted in a plural way. Put bluntly, how can there be a question of resemblance
of (Vκ , Vκ+1,∈) if there is no entity for it to resemble? Therefore in the present context the
plural interpretation is also dismissed.44
Instead of the interpretations discussed above, we propose to adopt a mereological inter-
pretation of proper classes. We hold that the mathematical universe is a mereological whole
and classes, proper as well as improper, are parts of the mathematical universe. We identify
those parts of V that are also parts of sets, i.e., that are set sized, with sets. This way the
threat of a hierarchy of super- and hyper-wholes is not looming. The fusion of the parts of
a whole does not create a super-whole, but just the whole itself. So there is no mereological
analogue of the creative force of the power set axiom: the mathematical ‘power set of’ con-
cept does not apply to parts, but only to sets. The mereological interpretation of classes that
we are proposing here is similar to David Lewis’ interpretation of sets.45 Lewis takes sets to
be generated by the singleton function and unrestricted mereological fusion. So sets, in his
view, have subsets as their mereological parts. Similarly, in our proposed interpretation,
classes have sub-classes (and not their elements) as their proper parts. In contrast to proper
classes, set are elements (of sets and of classes). Indeed we may think of, for example the
abstraction term in an instance of the Comprehension Scheme as specifying a part of some
set, and that instance as declaring that part a set. This device then allows us to declare any
part of a set to be a set.
43See Gabriel Uzquiano, op. cit., section 1.
44One person’s proof is another’s reductio: if one believes that there are independent compelling reasons to think
that the plural interpretation of classes is correct, then one might find intrinsic reasons to accept GRP lacking.
45David Lewis Parts of Classes. Basil Blackwell, 1986, and Mathematics is megethology. Philosophia Mathemat-
ica 3, 1993, p. 3–23.
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The difference between our proposed interpretation of the range of the second-order
quantifiers and Lewis’ theory of classes is that we do not take it upon ourselves to eluci-
date the nature of sets. Lewis regards the relation between an entity and its singleton as
thoroughly “mysterious”. Reluctantly, he takes it to be a structural relation (section 2.6, op.
cit.). Derivatively, there is, in Lewis’ approach, something mysterious about all sets. Given
the singleton-relation that is part of set theory, the elementhood relation for classes can be
explained in a straightforward way. For this reason Lewis thinks that the parthood relation
sheds some light on the question what sets are and what the elementhood relation is. We
are in a different position. As stated in the introduction, in this article we take set theory
as given, and do not commit ourselves to any specific interpretation (reductive or non-
reductive) of the membership relation: explaining the element-relation for sets is outside
the scope of this article.46
The mereological interpretation does support the reflection idea that we are developing
in this article. It allows us to give real content to the reflection thought that the whole (V)
resembles the part (Vκ). As mentioned before, GRP commits us to some class impredica-
tivity. But as with the plural interpretation, there is no reason to believe that only pred-
icatively definable parts of V exist. Indeed, the mereological seems a perfectly acceptable
interpretation of full Kelly-Morse class theory. Accepting GRPΣ0∞ does not commit us to
all impredicative instances of comprehension. However, it is easy to see that the stronger
principle GRPΣ1∞ does commit us to full impredicative comprehension.
47 Moreover, the
mereological interpretation of classes satisfies the two key philosophical desiderata that
according to Penelope Maddy an interpretation of class theory has to satisfy:48 (1) Classes
should be real, well-defined entities; (2) Classes should be significantly different from sets.
The first desideratum is satisfied because classes are just as real and well-defined as sets.
We treat parts as real entities, and the second desideratum is satisfied because the laws of
46For a critique of Lewis’ use of the parthood relation to help us understand the objects of set theory (as opposed
to class theory) and the relations they stand in, see Alex Oliver Parts of classes? Analysis 54(1994), p. 220–221.
47The axioms of Kelly-Morse hold at (Vκ ,∈ Vκ+1), and are then sent up by virtue of the Σ1∞ elementarity of j
(Σ0ω elementary is insufficient).
48p. 123 of Penelope Maddy, op. cit.
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parthood are significantly different from the laws governing sets.
IV Mathematical and mereological reflection
Even the weak versions of GRP yield strong large cardinal consequences that in some
sense can be said to ‘complete’ the theory of countable sets.49
The strength of strong versions of GRP lie between the statement that postulates a 1-
extendible cardinal and the statement that postulates the existence of the cardinal motivat-
ing the GRP: a subcompact cardinal.50
Large cardinal axioms can be formulated as postulating elementary embeddings from a
model M of set theory into another model N of set theory (“∃j : M −→ N”). The principle
that postulates the existence of 1-extendible cardinals marks a watershed in the theory of
large cardinals. For all weaker large cardinal axioms (with critical point κ), the embeddings
that they postulate are continuous at κ+, in the sense that sup j“κ+ = j(κ+). However from
the axiom of 1-extendible cardinals onward, the ‘=’ in this equality must be replaced by
‘<’. This discontinuity property is exploited time and time again in the theory of large
large cardinals.
As noted earlier, variants of GRP can be ordered according to the level of elementarity
that they require. It can be shown that changing the level of elementarity required alters the
strength of the resulting global reflection principle: NBG + GRPΣ0∞ can not prove “there is
a 1-extendible cardinal” but raising the elementarity to Σ11-preserving one can. So increasing
49In fact even the weakest GRP yields an unbounded class of measurable Woodin cardinals in V. Such properties
of V have been used repeatedly as the centrality of the notion of Woodin cardinal became apparent in the past
two decades. It occurs many times as a hypothesis in the theorems of Woodin, and implies key determinacy
properties in analysis via work of Martin, Steel (Donald Martin & John Steel, A Proof of Projective Determinacy,
Journal of the American Mathematical Society, 1989, 2 , p. 71-125) and Woodin, (W. Hugh Woodin, The Axiom of
Determinacy, Forcing Axioms and the Non-stationary Ideal. Logic and its Applications series, vol. 1, de Gruyter,
1999) and interestingly, in his proof of the fact of the absoluteness of the theory of the real continuum under all
possible attempts to alter it via Cohen style set forcing. In W. Hugh Woodin (The Continuum Hypothesis, Part
I , Notices of the American Mathematical Society, July 2001, p. 567-576) he outlines how the theory of projective
determinacy ‘completes’ the theory of the hereditarily countable sets, as the Dedekind-Peano Axioms do for the
natural numbers.
50Welch (EFI paper, op.cit.) emphasises that although the consistency of 1-extendibles implies that of the weakest
of the GRP’s, the motivation was very different from that of Reinhardt, briefly because subcompact cardinals
embody this kind of top-down reflection, while Reinhardt was interested in ‘projecting’ the universe upwards.
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the elementarity-requirement from Σ0∞ to Σ11 carries us over an important dividing line in
the theory of large cardinals.
We have classified Σ0∞ statements as mathematical statements because they only quan-
tify over sets. We have classified Σ1∞ statements as mereological statements because they
quantify over proper classes, which we regard as extra- or supra-mathematical objects. In
other words, we might call GRPΣ0∞ mathematical global reflection, whereas GRPΣ11 must al-
ready be regarded as mereological global reflection. The divide between mathematical and
mereological reflection then coincides with the discontinuity threshold above.
In fact, even GRPΣ1∞ does not express the reflection idea in its strongest form. Recall
that the guiding idea was that the set theoretic universe is absolutely indistinguishable from
some set-like initial segment of V. GRPΣ1∞ requires that the embedding j is elementary with
respect to the second-order language of set theory (that is, one without a satisfaction pred-
icate). If we have a satisfaction predicate in our arsenal, we might require even stronger
elementarity, viz. with respect to the second-order language including the satisfaction predi-
cate as a primitive. Since this same satisfaction predicate is used to express the elementarity
of j, it will have to be a non-Tarskian, type-free satisfaction predicate. However it is known
from the theory of the semantic paradoxes that type-free truth and satisfaction quickly lead
to contradictions. So care must be taken here.
But there are philosophical reasons for being cautious and not to go even as far as en-
dorsing GRPΣ1∞ . If everything we truly say about V and C is also true about some set Vκ and
its subsets, then what makes it the case that when we are using ‘V’ and ‘C’ in this article,
these terms refer to the set-theoretic universe and its classes, respectively, rather than to
some set and its subsets? If we insist on articulating GRP as requiring full Σ1∞ elementarity,
then if we only have the primitive notion of Satisfaction to single out V and C, this is also
true about some set Vκ and its subsets. However, if we articulate GRP as insisting only on
a form of mathematical elementarity, that is, Σ01 elementarity (which can be shown to be
self-strengthening and to imply Σ0∞ elementarity), then this worry is not pressing. Then
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we can say that mereological statements allow us to distinguish V and C from every set
together with its subsets. In view of this, we refrain from endorsing mereological global
reflection, but rather argue for the mathematical global reflection of GRP.
Conclusion
According to many, Cantor’s early view of the mathematical universe as a whole is hope-
lessly entangled with his theological views.51 In contrast, his later view of the set theoretic
universe and proper classes more generally as ‘inconsistent multiplicities’ is taken to be
less so, and can be seen as a first step in the direction of a modern view of the set theo-
retic reality. It can then either be seen as a prefiguration of a plural interpretation of proper
classes (as per George Boolos) or as a potentialist conception of the mathematical universe
in the spirit of Zermelo (as per Jane´).
In this article we have argued that good secular sense can be made of Cantor’s earlier
view of the set theoretic universe. It is an ontological view on which proper classes as
Absolute Infinities are recognised. Sets are all the mathematical objects there are. All the
sets together form, as Cantor The Younger said, a completed whole: the mathematical
universe V. However V itself is not a mathematical object. Proper classes are parts of the
universe. Every part of V is a completed whole. Every set is an element of V. The parthood
relation corresponds to the subclass relation, which is a transitive relation, and thus is not
the same as the set membership relation, which is not. The language of sets and parts of
V is the language of second-order set theory L2e. The first-order quantifiers range over all
sets. The second-order quantifiers range over all the parts of V. So we are ontologically
committed to the existence of sets, the universe of all sets (V), and a rich enough collection
of parts of V: we make no further ontological commitments. The sets certainly satisfy
ZFC. The parts of V satisfy at least predicative second-order comprehension. And the
class replacement axiom also holds. So we are licensed to postulate NBG class theory in
the language L2e.
51Christian Tapp, Absolute Infinity—a bridge between Mathematics and Theology? In N. Tennant (Ed.), Foundational
Adventures: Essays in Honor of Harvey M. Friedman. London: College Publications, 2012.
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Not only is this interpretation of Cantor’s earlier view perfectly coherent: it is also math-
ematically fruitful. It allows us to indirectly motivate strong principles of infinity, i.e., large
cardinal principles which play an important role in contemporary set theory.
Go¨del argued that mathematical axioms can be motivated in two ways: intrinsically,
and extrinsically.52 Extrinsic support for an axiom derives from its consequences. Thus
extrinsic motivations are success arguments; they are instances of inference to the best expla-
nation. Many believe that intrinsic justification for mathematical principles is more reliable
than extrinsic justification. Indeed, many do not think that external motivation for a math-
ematical axiom can provide strong confirmation of its truth. So it is an important question
to what extent large cardinal principles can be motivated intrinsically.
Mathematical reflection principles are intrinsically motivated. In particular GRP is not
motivated by the iterative concept alone, nor by the nature of set membership relation. It is
motivated by expanding our viewpoint and considering the whole structure of the universe
V with its classes. The thought in this paper is that the mathematical universe with its parts
is so ineffable that there is a rank κ such that (Vκ , Vκ+1,∈) is elementarily equivalent with
V with all its classes, and moreover can be connected, or embedded, in a sufficiently truth
preserving way, into the whole universe (V, C,∈). Cantor had no vantage point to see
anywhere near this far. In general, he mostly referred to the epistemic transcendence of the
set theoretic universe as a whole instead of drawing consequences from that transcendence
in the form of reflection principles.
The global reflection principle in its stronger forms is essentially a second-order reflec-
tion postulate. So to interpret it, we have to assign a clear meaning to the second-order
quantifiers. On Zermelo’s potentialist picture, this seems a tall order. Perhaps what Zer-
melo calls ‘meta-set theory’ allows quantification over absolute infinities, but this seems
counter to the potentialist spirit of Zermelo’s view, and his ‘meta-set theory’ has never
been articulated in any detail anyway. The pluralist interpretation of second-order quan-
52Kurt Go¨del, What is Cantor’s continuum problem? In: Go¨del, K., Collected Works, Volume II: Publications
1938–1974. Oxford University Press, 1990, p. 254–270.1964
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tification fares better. It may well give us a fairly clear interpretation of the second-order
quantifiers. However on this interpretation, and therefore also on the interpretation of the
second order quantifiers as ranging not only over sets but also over ‘inconsistent multi-
plicities’, the motivation for GRP becomes opaque: we have argued that it is hard to make
sense of the motivation for GRP in terms of a notion of resemblance, if we adopt an atti-
tude of classes as plurals. As far as we can see, it is only in terms of the interpretation of the
second-order quantifiers as ranging over parts of the universe that the intrinsic motivation
of GRP in our expanded sense can be articulated. For this reason we conclude that the
early Cantorian view of the set theoretical universe is mathematically the most fruitful one.
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